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I. INTRODUCTION
On any given day, almost all people come in contact with at least
one or two other people, though most of us usually come in contact with
many more. This contact occurs in employment settings, social settings,
educational settings, and public settings, such as the street or grocery
store. This contact that we have with other people can be characterized as
“interacting with others” and is part of the inherent nature of humans as
social beings.
Interacting with others can involve many abilities, including
speaking, seeing, hearing, listening, understanding, walking,
communicating, and others. These are all abilities that most people can
perform to some extent, and that most people take for granted. Although
some people may be better at these abilities than other people, one’s skill
or desire (as opposed to capability) in performing any of these abilities
does not affect the fact that it is being performed or, in the context of
contact with others, the fact that the person is interacting with others.
Most of the abilities listed above are considered “major life
activities” under the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 Nonetheless, there
is no judicial consensus on whether “interacting with others” itself is a
major life activity. Three circuits – the First, Ninth, and Second – have
addressed the issue of whether interacting with others is a major life

1
See infra Part II.B.2. For further discussion on major life activities see Lisa
Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the
“Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1405 (1999); Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV.
997 (2004); Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 217 (2004); Ann Hubbard, The Myth of Independence and the Major Life Activity of
Caring, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 327 (2004); Heidi R. Youngs, Reproduction as a
Major Life Activity Under the ADA: A Survey of the Law Beginning with the Eighth
Circuit, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 455 (1998); Kiren Dosanjh Zucker, The Meaning of Life:
Defining “Major Life Activities” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 86 MARQ. L.
REV. 957 (2003); Timothy D. Johnston, Reproduction Is Not a Major Life Activity:
Implications for HIV Infection as a Per Se Disability Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 189 (1999); Carolee Kvoriak Lezuch, Note, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Redefining “Major Life Activity” to Protect the
Mentally Disabled, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1839 (1999); Daniel A. McMillan, Note, Playing
with Work: Must “Work” Be Treated as a “Major Life Activity” for Purposes of the
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1333 (2004); Sarah Lynn
Oquist, Casenote, Reproduction Constitutes a “Major Life Activity” Under the ADA:
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1357 (1999); Melissa S. Wandersee, Comment, The Far-Reaching Effects of
Reproduction as a “Major Life Activity” Under the ADA: What Will This Expansion
Mean to Employers and Their Insured?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 429 (1999).
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activity.2 The First Circuit has said that it is not, while the Ninth and
Second Circuits have said that it is.3
This article argues that interacting with others is a major life
activity. Part II discusses the background of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, including its purpose and coverage, as well as how
“disability” is defined by the Act and judicial interpretation of the Act.4
Part III presents the circuit split on the issue and describes each of the
three circuit court decisions that have addressed the issue of whether
interacting with others is a major life activity.5 Part IV explains why the
Ninth and Second Circuits are correct in finding that “interacting with
others” is a “major life activity.”6 They are correct because the activity of
interacting with others falls within the Supreme Court’s definition of
“major” and it is similar to other activities that are major life activities.7
Part IV also discusses what the possible tests are for determining when
the major life activity of interacting with others is “substantially
limited,”8 and argues that the Second Circuit’s test is correct because it
addresses one’s ability to communicate with others, which is a
fundamental aspect of “interacting with others.”9 Part V concludes this
article.10
II. BACKGROUND
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
1. Rationale and Purpose of the Act
On July 26, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) into law.11 It was the world’s

2

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III. For further discussion on whether “interacting with others” is a
major life activity, see Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139 (2002); Mark
DeLoach, Note, Can’t We All Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with
Others” as a Major Life Activity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1313 (2004); Bryan P. Stephenson, Comment, I’m So Lonesome I Could Cry . . .
But Could I Sue?: Whether “Interacting with Others” Is a Major Life Activity Under the
ADA, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 773 (2004).
4
See infra Part III.
5
See infra Part III.
6
See infra Part IV.
7
See infra Part IV.A.
8
See infra Part IV.B.1.
9
See infra Part IV.B.2.
10
See infra Part V.
11
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 152, 221, 225,
3
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first comprehensive piece of legislation designed to give equal rights to
people with disabilities12 and was the culmination of a decades-long
campaign by advocates of rights for the disabled.13 The ADA was well
received and enjoyed enormous public support.14
Congress passed the ADA in response to “the continuing existence
of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice” against people
with disabilities.15 There may have also been some interest to give
disabled persons protection since the Supreme Court ruled in 1985 that
disabled persons were not a quasi-suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause, meaning legislation directed at them would not
receive heightened scrutiny.16 At the time of the ADA’s enactment there
were around forty-three million people living in the United States with
one or more physical or mental disabilities.17 At the time of the 2000
census, there were roughly fifty million Americans over the age of five
who were considered disabled.18
In the past, people with disabilities tended to be isolated and
segregated from society.19 Such forms of discrimination continue today
and are a “serious and pervasive social problem.”20 Discrimination
against disabled persons is generally the result of societal “stereotypes,
611, 711, and 29 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 2005)). When President Bush signed the ADA he
made some remarks, including the following:
This act is powerful in its simplicity. It will ensure that people with
disabilities are given the basic guarantees for which they have worked so
long and so hard: independence, freedom of choice, control of their lives,
the opportunity to blend fully and equally into the rich mosaic of the
American mainstream. Legally, it will provide our disabled community with
a powerful expansion of protections and then basic civil rights. It will
guarantee fair and just access to the fruits of American life which we all
must be able to enjoy.
President George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (July 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1990/90072600.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
12
President George H. W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/
papers/1990/90072600.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
13
Kevin L. Cope, Comment, Sutton Misconstrued: Why the ADA Should Now Permit
Employers to Make Their Employees Disabled, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1758 (2004).
14
Id.
15
ADA § 2(a)(9), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(9).
16
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985).
17
ADA § 2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(1).
18
See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Quick Table P21, Disability Status of the
Civilian Noninstitutional Population (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet
/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP21&-ds_
name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-_lang=en&-_sse=on (note that this table only counted those
individuals not living in institutions) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
19
ADA § 2(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(2).
20
Id.
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discomfort, misconceptions, and unfounded fears” that are not
representative of the abilities of such persons to participate in and
contribute to society.21
In passing the Act, Congress pointed out that discrimination against
people with disabilities occurs in many different areas including
“employment,
housing,
public
accommodations,
education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health
services, voting, and access to public services.”22 Congress also
recognized that intentional exclusion is not the only type of
discrimination suffered by disabled persons, but that the way buildings,
transportation systems, and communications systems are designed also
have a discriminatory effect on the disabled.23 Until the ADA was
enacted, disabled persons were even more disadvantaged from a legal
standpoint than individuals who suffered discrimination on the basis of
their “race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age” because, unlike
these other individuals, disabled persons “often had no legal recourse to”
remedy such discrimination.24
Congress specifically stated four purposes of the ADA. First, the
Act was meant to provide a thorough and understandable directive for
the elimination of discrimination against disabled persons.25 Second, it
was meant to provide standards for addressing discrimination based on
disability that are “clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforceable.”26 Third,
it was meant to make sure that the Federal Government “plays a central
role in enforcing the standards established by [the Act] on behalf of
individuals with disabilities.”27 Finally, the Act was meant to bring the
force of congressional authority into play, especially Congress’ power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the interstate commerce power,
enabling the major areas of discrimination against disabled persons to be
addressed.28 Congress also stated that the proper goals with regard to
people with disabilities are “to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals.”29
21
D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother’s Keeper: Disabilities, Paternalism, and Threats
to Self, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 67 (2003). See also ADA § 2(a)(7), 42 U.S.C.A.
§12101(a)(7).
22
ADA § 2(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(3).
23
Id. § 2(a)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(5).
24
Id. § 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(4).
25
Id. § 2(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1).
26
Id. § 2(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(2).
27
Id. § 2(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(3).
28
Id. § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4).
29
Id. § 2(a)(8), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8).
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2. Coverage of the Act
The ADA is divided into five titles.30 Title I addresses
discrimination against disabled persons in employment situations.31 Title
II addresses discrimination in public services, including the acts of public
entities and the availability of public transportation.32 Title III addresses
public accommodations and services operated by private entities.33 Title
IV addresses the discriminatory effect of telecommunications systems on
the hearing or speech-impaired, including public service
announcements.34 Title V contains miscellaneous provisions.35
The ADA applies to private employers with 15 or more
employees,36 labor organizations, joint labor-management committees,
employment agencies,37 state and local governments or entities thereof,38
and private entities that operate public accommodations and services.39
The ADA does not apply to the federal government,40 except for those
employed by the U.S. Senate, the House of Representatives, and other
Congressional entities (e.g. Library of Congress),41 Indian tribes, or bona
fide private membership clubs.42
Different entities have the authority to issue regulations
implementing different parts of the ADA. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has the authority43 to promulgate
regulations dealing with Title I,44 which contains the employment
provisions of the ADA. The Attorney General has the authority45 to
promulgate regulations implementing Title II, Subtitle A,46 which
contains the provisions relating to public services, and the authority47 to

30

Id. § 1, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 Note.
Id. §§ 101-108, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117.
32
Id. §§ 201-246, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12165.
33
Id. §§ 301-310, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189.
34
ADA §§ 401, 402, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 152, 221, 225, 611(West 2005) (amending the
Communications Act of 1934).
35
Id. §§ 501-514, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12202-12213.
36
Id. § 101(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A).
37
Id. § 101(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(2).
38
Id. § 201(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(1).
39
Id. § 301(6)-(7), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(6)-(7).
40
Id. § 101(5)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B).
41
JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 793-94 n.b (5th ed. 2001).
42
ADA § 101(5)(B)(i)-(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B)(i)-(ii).
43
Id. § 106, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12116.
44
Id. §§ 101-108, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117.
45
Id. § 204, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12134.
46
Id. §§ 201-205, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12134.
47
Id. § 306(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12186(b).
31
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promulgate such regulations for Title III,48 excluding the transportation
provisions.49 The Secretary of Transportation has the authority50 to
promulgate regulations implementing Title II, Subtitle B,51 which
contains provisions dealing with public transportation, and the authority52
to promulgate such regulations for the transportation provisions of Title
III.53 The Federal Communications Commission has the authority54 to
promulgate regulations implementing Title IV,55 which contains the
provisions dealing with telecommunications and public service
announcements. Also, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board is granted authority to “issue minimum guidelines
that shall supplement the existing Minimum Guidelines and
Requirements for Accessible Design” with regard to Title II and Title
III.56
In addition to the responsibility of promulgating regulations in their
respective areas, each federal entity is charged with “render[ing]
technical assistance to individuals and institutions that have rights or
duties under the respective title or titles for which such agency has
responsibility.”57 The duty of implementing a plan for such assistance is
divided up by Title.58 For Title I, the EEOC and the Attorney General are
charged with implementing the plan for assistance.59 The Attorney
General must also implement the plan for assistance for Title II, Subtitle
A.60 For Title II, Subtitle B, the Secretary of Transportation must
implement the plan of assistance.61 For Title III, the Attorney General
must coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation and the Chair of the
Architectural Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to implement
the plan.62 Finally, the Chairman of the Federal Communications

48

Id. §§ 301-310, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189.
Id. §§ 302(b)(2)(B)-(C), 304 (other than (b)(4)), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12182(b)(2)(B)(C), 12184 (other than (b)(4)).
50
Id. §§ 223, 229, 244, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12143(b), 12149, 12164.
51
Id. §§ 221-246, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12141-12165.
52
Id. § 306(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12186(a)(1).
53
Id. §§ 302(b)(2)(B)-(C), 304 (other than (b)(4)), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12182(b)(2)(B)(C), 12184 (other that (b)(4)).
54
Id. § 401(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 225(d)(1).
55
Id. §§ 401, 402, 47 U.S.C.A. § 152, 221, 225, 611.
56
Id. § 504, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12204.
57
Id. § 506(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(1).
58
Id. § 506(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2).
59
Id. § 506(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(A).
60
Id. § 506(c)(2)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(B)(i).
61
Id. § 506(c)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(B)(ii).
62
Id. § 506(c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(C).
49
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Commission must coordinate with the Attorney General to implement
the plan for Title IV.63
Even with all this delegation of authority, the Supreme Court has
noted that “[n]o agency . . . has been given authority to issue regulations
implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, which fall
outside Titles I-V. Most notably, no agency has been delegated authority
to interpret the term ‘disability.’”64 The Court, however, used the
EEOC’s regulations on the definition of “disability” in its analysis.65 The
Court declined to decide what deference was due these regulations.66
This article focuses on the definition of disability found in the
preliminary sections of the Act.67 This definition will be examined and
discussed in the following section.68
B. Disability Defined
The ADA states that “[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to
an individual – (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.”69 Although much of the focus of this paper will be on what
is considered to be a major life activity, the other elements of the
definition will be discussed so that “major life activity” can be placed
within the framework of “disability.” The determination of disability is
made on an individualized basis.70
1. Physical or Mental Impairment
Impairment is the first element that must be met for an individual to
be considered disabled.71 The ADA does not contain a list of
impairments that would qualify.72 Therefore, courts have taken an
individualized approach to determining whether something should be

63

Id. § 506(c)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12206(c)(2)(D).
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (citation omitted); see
ADA §§ 1-3, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12102; see also id. § 3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)
(defining disability).
65
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480.
66
Id.
67
ADA § 3, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102.
68
See infra Part II.B.
69
ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
70
Id.; see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483; Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 657 (1997)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also infra notes 73, 124
and accompanying text.
71
ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
72
FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 802.
64
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considered an impairment under the ADA.73 This determination is guided
by interpretive regulations issued by several federal agencies that have
been assigned by Congress to administer and enforce the ADA.74 One
such regulation issued by the EEOC provides that a physical impairment
includes:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.75

Conversely, the ADA specifically excludes certain conditions from
the definition of disability. These conditions include the current use of
illegal drugs,76 transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling,
kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from current illegal use of drugs.77 With regard to an
individual’s illegal drug use, that individual’s condition is not excluded
from the definition of “disability” if he or she:
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation
program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or
has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer
engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is
no longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not
engaging in such use . . . . 78
73
Id. This makes sense considering that disability as a whole must be determined on
an individualized basis. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74
FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 802.
75
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2005).
76
ADA §§ 104(a), 510(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12114(a), 12210(a).
77
Id. § 511(b)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211(b)(1)-(3).
78
Id. § 104(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(b). Current drug use is not a disability, but
because past drug use can be a disability, it is critical to determine when the employee
was using drugs. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 803.
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However, it is not a violation of the ADA for an employer “to adopt or
administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to
drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in paragraph
(1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.”79
A condition need not be permanent in order to be covered by the
ADA. “[A]lthough ‘temporary, non-chronic impairments of short
duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not
disabilities,’ an impairment does not have to be permanent to rise to the
level of a statutory disability.”80
Determining whether there is an impairment is the first step in
determining whether an individual is “disabled.” The next step is to
determine whether one of the individual’s major life activities is limited
by the impairment.
2. Major Life Activity
As mentioned above, this article will focus on the meaning of
“major life activity.” The ADA does not list what is included in the
definition of major life activity. The EEOC has provided guidance by
stating that major life activities include “functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working.”81 The Supreme Court has also added
procreation to this list.82 Several circuits have added other activities to
the list83 such as eating,84 sleeping,85 and sexual relations.86 One circuit
has said that bowling, camping, restoring cars, and mowing the lawn are
not major life activities.87 The EEOC has provided further guidance in
the appendix to its regulations relating to the ADA, stating that “‘[m]ajor
life activities’ are those basic activities that the average person in the
79

ADA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(b).
FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 803 (quoting the EEOC Interpretive and
Compliance Manuals); see also Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998)
(adopting the EEOC’s position), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999).
81
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2005).
82
Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1997).
83
For a discussion on judicial responses to efforts to expand the list of major life
activities, including (1) the physical activities of eating, sleeping, controlling bodily
waste, running, exercise, and sports; physical agility and sexual relations; (2) the mental
activities of concentration and thinking, awareness, and memory; (3) interpersonal
activities; (4) the educational activities of education and test-taking; and reading; (5)
transportation activities; and (6) miscellaneous activities, see Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes
and Ladders: Expanding the Definition of “Major Life Activity” in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 321, 340-65 (2002).
84
Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001).
85
McAlindin v. San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999).
86
Id.
87
Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. 221 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2000).
80
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general population can perform with little or no difficulty.”88 The
appendix also noted that the list of examples listed in the actual
regulation89 is not exhaustive and “other major life activities include, but
are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching.”90
The Supreme Court has provided some guidance on how to define
“major.” In Bragdon v. Abbott,91 the Court considered whether the
plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life activity of
reproduction because she was HIV positive.92 In determining that
reproduction is a major life activity, the Court stated that “the plain
meaning of the word ‘major’ denotes comparative importance and
suggests that the touchstone for determining an activity’s inclusion under
the statutory rubric is its significance.”93 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his
concurrence in part and dissent in part, disagreed.94 He said that the
majority ignored the “alternative definition of ‘major’ as ‘greater in
quantity, number, or extent.’”95 This is the definition that he thought was
most consistent with the ADA’s example list of major life activities.96 He
based this conclusion on his observation that “the common thread”
linking the activities listed in the EEOC regulation is that they “are
repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a
normally functioning individual.”97 Justice O’Connor, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist and stated:
the act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part of
the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the
representative major life activities of all persons – “caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working” – listed in
regulations relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.98

In Bragdon, the defendant claimed that Congress intended the ADA
to cover only activities that had a “public, economic, or daily

88

29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (2005).
See id.; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
90
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i).
91
524 U.S. 624 (1998).
92
Id. at 628.
93
Id. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 107 F.3d
934, 939-940 (1st Cir. 1997)).
94
Id. at 659-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95
Id. at 660.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 664-65. (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89
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character.”99 The Court, however, rejected this argument stating that
“[n]othing in the definition suggests that activities without a public,
economic, or daily dimension may somehow be regarded as so
unimportant or insignificant as to fall outside the meaning of the word
‘major.’”100
Another case in which the Court commented on the meaning of
“major” was Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.101
In that case the Court characterized “major” by combining its definition
from Bragdon with the definition that Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor advocated in their separate opinions in Bragdon.102
Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the Court in Toyota.103 The Court
stated that the term “‘[m]ajor’ in the phrase ‘major life activities’ means
important.”104 “Major life activity,” thus, refers to those activities that are
of central importance to daily life.”105 The Court further noted that “[i]f
each of the tasks included in the major life activity [in question] does not
independently qualify as a major life activity, then together they must do
so.”106
Determining what activities are “major” for purposes of “major life
activity” is an important step in determining whether an individual is
disabled under the ADA. The fact that there is not an absolute bright-line
standard can be a benefit to plaintiffs because it allows them the
opportunity to argue that a certain activity should be considered a major
life activity.
3. Substantial Limitation
Once it is determined that there is a major life activity involved, the
next step is to determine whether that major life activity is substantially
limited. Like “major life activity,” the ADA does not define
“substantially limits.”107 The EEOC has defined “substantially limits” to
mean
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform; or

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 638 (majority opinion).
Id.
534 U.S. 184 (2002).
See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187.
Id. at 197 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1363 (1976)).
Id.
Id.
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
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(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.108

The EEOC provides a list of factors that should be considered in
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity.109 This list includes “[t]he nature and severity of the impairment,
. . . [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment, and . . . [t]he
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term
impact of or resulting from the impairment.”110 In the interpretive
appendix to its regulations on the ADA, the EEOC provides that
“temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no
long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.”111 Examples
of impairments that fall into this category “may include, but are not
limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and
influenza. Similarly, except in rare circumstances, obesity is not
considered a disabling impairment.”112
The EEOC regulations also specifically address the major life
activity of working.113 With regard to working, substantially limits means
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills and abilities.”114 However, “the
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”115 There are
also some separate factors to consider, in addition to the general factors
listed above, when determining if the activity of working is substantially
limited.116 These factors include:
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable
access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2005).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(2).
Id.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2005).
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2005).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
Id.
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
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that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment, and the number and types of other
jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities,
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in
various classes).117

The Supreme Court has provided some guidance on the issue of
“substantial limitation.” It is not necessary that plaintiffs show that they
cannot perform the major life activity at all, because the ADA “addresses
substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities.”118
Thus, when the impairment significantly limits the major life activity, the
definition is satisfied, even if there is not a complete or total limitation.119
However, plaintiffs must show that their activities are in fact
substantially limited.120 The Court has stated that “‘substantially’
suggests ‘considerable’ or ‘specified to a large degree.’”121 Therefore, a
“mere difference” in how that activity is performed does not amount to a
“significant restriction.”122 The Court has also stated that “[t]he word
‘substantial’ . . . clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a
minor way with the performance of [a major life activity] from
qualifying as disabilities.”123 When proving that the limitation is
substantial, plaintiffs must prove that the degree of the limitation caused
by their impairment is substantial in terms of their own personal
experience.124 Thus, substantiality must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.
Much of the Court’s guidance in this area has been in the context of
the major life activity of working.125 With regard to the major life

117

Id.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1997).
119
Id.
120
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999).
121
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (citing WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1976)); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002).
122
Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 565.
123
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
124
Id. at 198 (quoting Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 567).
125
See Sutton, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (rejecting myopia as a substantial limitation on
the major life activity of working); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516
(1999) (rejecting high blood pressure as a substantial limitation on the major life activity
of working); Albertson’s, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (rejecting monocular vision as a
substantial limitation on the major life activity of working, but noting that a monocular
118
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activity of working, the Court said that to show substantial limitation
plaintiffs must allege that they are “unable to work in a broad class of
jobs,”126 not just “one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of
choice.”127 The Court further noted that if there are jobs available that
utilize an individual’s skills, though not necessarily the individual’s
unique talents, then the individual is not precluded from working in a
broad class of jobs.128
After the passage of the ADA, there was division among the circuit
courts on whether an individual’s impairment should be considered in its
natural state or as affected by mitigating or correcting factors, such as
glasses or contacts, medication, or prosthetic devices, when determining
if the condition substantially limits a major life activity.129 The Supreme
Court resolved the issue in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.130 The Court
stated that when it considered the ADA as a whole it was clear that “if a
person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental
impairment, the effects of those measures – both positive and negative –
must be taken into account when judging whether that person is
‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under
the Act.”131 The ADA requires a present substantial limitation of a major
life activity for a disability to exist, not a possible or hypothetical
substantial limitation.132 The Court reasoned that if an individual corrects
his or her condition, though he or she is still impaired, there is no
impairment that presently substantially limits a major life activity.133 The
Court also concluded that to evaluate persons in their uncorrected or
unmitigated state is in direct opposition of the ADA’s mandate to do an
individualized inquiry.134 In another case, decided on the same day as
Sutton, the Court extended this rule to cover cases where the mitigation
measures are undertaken, “whether consciously or not, within the body’s
own systems.”135
individual might be able to show a substantial limitation on the major life activity of
seeing).
126
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
127
Id. at 492.
128
Id.
129
FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 41, at 806.
130
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
131
Id. at 482.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 482-83.
134
Id. at 483.
135
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (holding that the
plaintiff’s subconscious ability to compensate for his visual impairment should be taken
into consideration when determining whether he was substantially limited in a major life
activity).
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Even if a plaintiff establishes that his or her impairment affects a
major life activity, the substantial limitation requirement can be a
significant hurdle to overcome. However, once this final element is met,
an individual will be considered “disabled” for purposes of the ADA.
4. The “Record Of” and “Regarded As” Prongs of the “Disability”
Definition
As the definition of “disability” makes clear, the ADA applies to
individuals for whom there is a record of the individual’s impairment and
for individuals who are regarded as having an impairment.136 The
inclusion of the “record of” and “regarded as” prongs of the definition of
disability shows that Congress was aware that the perception of disability
can lead to discrimination against individuals even if they are not
currently disabled.137
The EEOC has defined “record of such impairment” to mean “has a
history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”138
Courts have agreed that the requirement of a substantial limitation on a
major life activity also applies to an individual bringing a claim based on
having a record of impairment.139
The EEOC has defined “regarded as having such impairment” to
mean
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered
entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in . . . this section but is
treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment.140

136

ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 2005).
Sarah Shaw, Comment, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs
Who Do Not Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1981, 1993 (2002).
138
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2005).
139
See, e.g., Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1998) and
Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 321 (5th Cir. 1997).
140
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2005).
137
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The Supreme Court also has provided some guidance on the issue. The
Court has stated that there are two ways in which individuals will fall
within the scope of the “regarded as” definition of disability:141 first, if “a
covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;” or,
second, if “a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual,
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities.”142 An example of the first case would be if an employer
mistakenly believes that a person is hearing impaired, when the person in
fact is not, and the employer treats the person differently because of this
mistaken belief. An example of the second case would be if an employer
knows that a person has dyslexia and thinks that this substantially limits
the person’s ability to do his or her job, when in fact it is not a substantial
limitation, and the employer treats the person differently because of this
belief. “In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain
misperceptions about the individual – it must believe either that one has a
substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a
substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so
limiting.”143 The Court summed up by stating that “[a]n employer runs
afoul of the ADA when it makes an employment decision based on a
physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as
substantially limiting a major life activity.”144
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
To date, only three circuits have decided the issue of whether
“interacting with others” is considered a “major life activity” under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.145 All other circuits that have been
faced with the issue have declined to decide it one way or the other.146
141

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 490.
145
See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
getting along with others is not a major life activity under the ADA, but that interacting
with others is a major life activity); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226,
1234-35 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that interacting with others is a major life activity under
the ADA); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that
getting along with others is not a major life activity under the ADA).
146
See Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 274 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting that it had previously expressed doubt about the assertion that interacting with
others is a major life activity and stating “[w]e decline to resolve this issue here because,
assuming that interacting with others is a major life activity, [plaintiff] has not
demonstrated that it is an activity in which she is substantially limited”); Heisler v.
Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003) (assuming for purposes of the case
that interacting with others is a major life activity, but stating that “[r]egardless of
142
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The First Circuit has decided that “getting along with others” is not a
major life activity under the ADA.147 The Ninth Circuit has decided that
“interacting with others” is a major life activity under the ADA.148 The
Second Circuit has held that “getting along with others” is not a major
life activity, but that “interacting with others” is a major life activity.149
A. The Not a Major Life Activity Approach
As stated above, the First Circuit has found that “interacting with
others” is not a major life activity.150 In Soileau v. Guilford of Maine,
Inc.,151 Randall Soileau sued his former employer, Guilford of Maine
(“Guilford”), for wrongful termination claiming he was discriminated
against on the basis of his disability.152 Soileau worked for Guilford in
various capacities from 1979 to 1994.153 In 1992, Soileau began working
for a new supervisor, Matt Earnest, who thought that Soileau’s
performance was not up to par and that he had a negative attitude.154 At
Earnest’s instruction, Soileau surveyed his co-workers’ opinions of his
performance.155 Earnest then asked him to draft a plan to deal with the
weak areas identified in the survey, but Soileau refused to do this
because he did not think that the survey showed any weak areas.156
Soileau also refused to train a co-worker after Earnest instructed him to
do so and a dispute arose between them.157 Earnest issued Soileau a
“Final Written Warning/Suspension” on March 23, 1994, and Soileau
was suspended for two days to evaluate his own performance and draft

whether we treat interacting with others as a separate major life activity or a subset of the
broader activities of learning or working, [plaintiff] has similarly failed to provide
sufficient evidence that her major depressive disorder has substantially limited her ability
to interact with others . . . ”); MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 337
(6th Cir. 2002) (noting “that it has been held that ‘interacting with others,’ is a major life
activity” but failing to decide the issue); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255
(10th Cir. 2001) (declining to address whether interacting with others is a major life
activity because plaintiff would not be able to establish a substantial limitation even if it
were a major life activity); see also Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 511
(7th Cir. 2001) (describing “interacting with others” as one of “many activities that feed
into the major life activities of learning and working”).
147
Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15.
148
McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1234-35.
149
Jacques, 386 F.3d at 202-03.
150
See Soileau, 105 F.3d 12.
151
Id. at 15.
152
Id. at 13.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
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an improvement plan.158 Upon returning to work he began a four-week
monitoring period.159 Soileau, stressed because of the warning, saw a
psychologist, Dr. Dannel Starbird.160 Dr. Starbird had previously
diagnosed Soileau with a chronic depressive disorder known as
dysthymia, which is a disorder that is “characterized by intermittent
bouts of depression.”161 Dr. Starbird determined that Soileau was
suffering from one of these bouts of depression.162 Earnest
accommodated Soileau’s condition by relieving him of his
responsibilities that involved significant interaction with other people.163
At the end of the four-week monitoring period Soileau had not shown
any improvement in the problem areas, nor had he submitted his plan for
improvement.164 He was thus terminated on April 22, 1994.165
Soileau sued Guilford for discrimination.166 The district court
granted summary judgment for Guilford, and Soileau appealed.167 The
First Circuit affirmed, holding that Soileau did not meet the definition of
disabled under the ADA.168 The court considered the three elements that
must be met, which are “(1) that he had a ‘physical or mental
impairment’ that (2) ‘substantially limits’ (3) ‘a major life activity.’”169
The court conceded that Soileau met the first element because he was
diagnosed with dysthymia, but stated that Soileau could not meet the
second and third elements.170
The court discussed whether the ability to get along with others is a
major life activity.171 The court first noted that the EEOC regulations do
not list this ability as an example of a major life activity.172 However, the
court also noted in a footnote that the EEOC Compliance Manual does
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Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
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list interacting with others as a major life activity,173 but dismissed the
manual as “hardly binding.”174
The court stated that the phrase “‘ability to get along with others’ is
remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to make it unworkable as a
definition” and that “to impose legally enforceable duties on an employer
based on such an amorphous concept would be problematic.”175 The
court also noted that the ability to get along with others is different in
kind from other major life activity examples used in the EEOC
regulations, such as breathing or walking.176 The court left the door
slightly open by stating that “a more narrowly defined concept going to
essential attributes of human communication could, in a particular
setting, be understood to be a major life activity . . . .”177
The court concluded that, even assuming that “the ability to get
along with others” is a major life activity, Soileau’s claim would fail
because he did not provide any evidence of a substantial limitation.178
This was because Soileau did not have trouble interacting with anyone
but his supervisor.179 The court also said there was no substantial
limitation because the limitations that Soileau’s condition imposed, such
as wanting to leave bars and stores when they got crowded, were
common among the population in general and were “not
extraordinary.”180 The fact that he felt inclined to leave crowded places
was not enough to show that his impairment was severe enough to be a
substantial limitation.181 Soileau also failed to produce evidence that his
condition would be long-term, and thus could not show that it was a
substantial limitation.182 The court then affirmed the grant of summary
judgment for Guilford.183

173
Id. at 15 n.2 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 902.3, ¶ 6883, at 5311
(1995), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html (last modified Feb. 1,
2000)).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 15.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
183
Id. at 17.
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B. The Major Life Activity Approach
Two circuits have decided that interacting with others is a major
life activity: the Ninth Circuit, in McAlindin v. County of San Diego,184
and the Second Circuit, in Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.185
In McAlindin, plaintiff Richard McAlindin sued the County of San
Diego for discrimination in the way he was treated at work, which he
alleged was on the basis of his disability.186 McAlindin began working as
a systems analyst for the County’s Housing and Community
Development Department in September 1983.187 He was diagnosed with
anxiety disorders, panic disorders, and somatoform disorders,188 for
which he received psychotherapy and medication.189 In 1989, McAlindin
received a provisional promotion that required him to perform new and
very stressful duties.190 As a result, McAlindin sought and was granted
leave due to “work stress.”191 McAlindin again took leave for stress in
1992.192 While he was on leave, he repeatedly requested that the County
transfer him to a job that was less stressful as a “reasonable
accommodation” required by the ADA.193 The County offered to put his
name on a transfer list, but refused to give him special treatment to
ensure a transfer.194 When he returned to work he felt that he was treated
differently and was given a written warning for sleeping on the job.195 He
also believed that he was treated differently when it came to training
opportunities because he was not sent to off-site training like another
systems analyst.196
The district court granted summary judgment for the County on
McAlindin’s disability claim, holding that he did not have a disability
within the meaning of the ADA, and McAlindin appealed.197 The Ninth
184

192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999).
386 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2004).
186
McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1232.
187
Id. at 1230.
188
Id. “A somatoform disorder is a ‘condition marked by the presence of symptoms
suggesting a physical disease but without physical changes or physiological mechanisms
that might account for the symptoms.’” Id. at 1230 n.1 (quoting J.E. SCHMIDT, 5
ATTORNEY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER at S-206 (1999)). “In addition,
there must be evidence, or a strong suggestion, that the symptoms have a psychogenic or
psychologic origin.” Id. (quoting same).
189
Id. at 1230.
190
Id. at 1231.
191
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1231-32.
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Id. at 1232.
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Circuit reversed, holding that interacting with others is a “major life
activity” and that there was a triable issue as to whether McAlindin was
substantially limited in that major life activity.198
The Ninth Circuit accepted the fact that McAlindin was impaired.199
Next, the court addressed whether McAlindin asserted a major life
activity.200 The court cited the EEOC regulations, stating that “major life
activities include ‘functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working.’”201 The court reasoned that “[b]ecause interacting with
others is an essential, regular function, like walking and breathing, it
easily falls within the definition of ‘major life activity.’”202
The court cited the First Circuit’s finding that the “ability to get
along with others” was too vague to be a major life activity.203 The court
responded by stating that it saw “nothing in the statutory text that makes
vagueness the test for determining what is a major life activity.”204
Additionally, the court stated that interaction with others is “no more
vague than ‘caring for oneself,’ which has been widely recognized as a
major life activity.”205
The court also pointed out that recognizing interacting with others
as a major life activity does not mean that a person will be considered to
be substantially limited in that activity just because he or she is
“cantankerous.”206 Merely having trouble getting along with co-workers
is not enough to show that there is a substantial limitation.207 The court
held that, to prove substantial limitation of the major life activity of
interacting with others, a plaintiff must show that his or her “relations
with others were characterized on a regular basis by severe problems, for
example, consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or
failure to communicate when necessary.”208 The court remanded for trial
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Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1233.
Id.
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Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1997)).
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Id. at 1234.
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Id. (quoting Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997)).
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Id. at 1234.
205
Id. at 1235. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998) (citing 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997)); Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d
775, 781 (6th Cir. 1998).
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on the issue, among others, of whether McAlindin was substantially
limited in the major life activity of interacting with others.209
The other circuit that has found that “interacting with others” is a
major life activity is the Second Circuit. In Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.,210
plaintiff Audrey Jacques sued her former employer, DiMarzio, alleging
that she was fired because she was “regarded as” disabled.211 DiMarzio
hired Jacques in 1989 to package and assemble guitar components in its
factory.212 During her tenure she received average to above-average
employee evaluations.213 Jacques had psychiatric problems since she was
a teenager.214 She suffered “severe and major depressions” and was
treated for these problems for over forty years.215 In 1992, she informed
the plant manager, Michael Altilio, that she “was suffering from severe
depression and a depression disorder” and that she was taking Prozac.216
Altilio was “very understanding” of Jacques’ condition and was
supportive of her taking a two-week leave of absence.217 Jacques’
supervisor, Betty Capotosto, was not as sympathetic and told Jacques
that while she was on leave she should “get crayons and a coloring book
and make pot holders.”218 Jacques was diagnosed with a chronic form of
bi-polar disorder in 1993.219 Her psychiatrist stated that her condition
“made her vulnerable in social interactions such that she would react in
unpredictable ways.”220 He also recommended that she work in a
“structured, well-defined environment . . . with her own semi-closed
space such as a cubicle would provide.”221 Towards the end of 1996,
Jacques’ working relationship with Altilio and Capotosto became
strained and Altilio told Jacques that, because of her “ongoing conflicts
with other workers,” he wanted her to work exclusively from her
home.222 Before Altilio and Jacques could agree on the terms of an
independent contractor arrangement, Altilio informed Jacques that one of
her coworkers, Leandra Mangin, had filed a harassment complaint
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against Jacques.223 Jacques admitted that she teased and ridiculed
Mangin, but said that it was “girl-talk and not harassment.”224 About a
week later, Altilio asked the owner of the company, Larry DiMarzio,
about the possibility of Jacques working at home and DiMarzio rejected
the idea.225 Instead, he instructed Altilio to terminate Jacques because of
her “‘numerous conflicts with supervisors and . . . coworkers.’”226 Altilio
informed Jacques of his conversation with DiMarzio and told her that she
was terminated.227 After failing to get relief before the National Labor
Relations Board and the New York State Division of Human Rights,
Jacques sought and received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and
brought suit under the ADA and state law.228
The district court granted summary judgment for DiMarzio on
Jacques’ discrimination claims relating to her ability to take care of
herself or work as major life activities, but held there was a “triable issue
of fact as to whether DiMarzio regarded Jacques as having ‘severe
problems’ ‘on a regular basis’ in her ‘relations with others.’”229 The jury
found for Jacques and awarded her damages.230 DiMarzio appealed and
Jacques cross-appealed from the district court ruling that she did not
make out a prima facie case for her first two claims.231 The Second
Circuit reversed the jury verdict based on an error in the district court’s
jury instructions, but affirmed the district court’s finding that Jacques did
not make out a prima facie case for her first two claims.232
The court first laid out the elements of a prima facie case under the
ADA.233 These elements are: “(1) plaintiff’s employer is subject to the
ADA; (2) plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3)
plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her
job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff
suffered [an] adverse employment action because of her disability.”234
The court noted that DiMarzio conceded that it was a covered entity
under the ADA before moving on to discuss whether Jacques was
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Id. (alteration in original).
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Id. at 198.
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Id. (quoting Cameron v. Cmty. Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 63
(2d Cir. 2003)).
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“disabled.”235 The court observed that “[i]ndividuals with ‘a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual’ are disabled within the meaning of the
ADA.”236 The court also noted that an individual could be considered
disabled within the meaning of the ADA if there is a record of the
disability or if the individual was mistakenly regarded as having an
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.237
DiMarzio conceded that Jacques’ disorder was an impairment for
purposes of the ADA.238 Therefore, the court only needed to consider the
issues of “whether ‘interacting with others’ [was] a major life activity
protected under the ADA and, if so, what showing is necessary for a
plaintiff to be considered ‘substantially limited’ in ‘interacting with
others.’”239 The court then discussed the prior circuit court decisions of
Soileau and McAlindin.240 It declined to follow either approach.241 The
court noted that “there is a difference between ‘get[ting] along with
others’ (the life activity considered in Soileau) and ‘interacting with
others’ (the life activity considered in McAlindin).”242 The court agreed
with the First Circuit in Soileau that “‘get[ting] along with others’ is an
unworkably subjective definition of a ‘major life activity’ under the
ADA – in much the same way that ‘perceiving’ (as distinct from merely
‘seeing’ or ‘hearing’) would be an unworkably subjective ‘major life
activity.’”243 The court also agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s
“characterization of ‘interacting with others’ as ‘an essential, regular
function’ that ‘easily falls within the definition of major life activity.’”244
The court reasoned that “interacting with others” more objectively
describes a life activity than does “getting along with others,” which the
court said implies “proficiency or success and worsens the problem of
subjectivity . . . .”245 The court concluded that interacting with others is a
major life activity under the ADA, but did not adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
test for determining when there is a substantial limitation because it “is
unworkable, unbounded, and useless as guidance to employers,
235

Id. at 198 n.6.
Id. at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Felix v. N.Y. City Transit
Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2003)).
237
Id.
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Id. at 201.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 202 (discussing Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997)
and McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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Id.
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Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15).
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Id. (quoting McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1234) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.
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employees, judges, and juries.”246 Instead the court held that a plaintiff is
substantially limited in interacting with others when plaintiff’s “mental
or physical impairment severely limits the fundamental ability to
communicate with others.”247 The court then stated that this standard is
met “when the impairment severely limits the plaintiff’s ability to
connect with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people – at the
most basic level of these activities.”248 Conversely, the court provided
that the standard is not met when a plaintiff’s “ability to communicate
with others is not substantially limited but whose communication is
inappropriate, ineffective, or unsuccessful.”249 The court ultimately
remanded the case because the district court erred in giving the jury
instructions, which prejudiced DiMarzio.250
IV. ANALYSIS
The federal circuits are divided over whether to consider
“interacting with others” as a major life activity under the ADA and on
how to determine when that activity is substantially limited.251 The first
step in the analysis will be to show that interacting with others is in fact a
major life activity. To do this it is necessary to look at how the Supreme
Court has defined the term “major” and how interacting with others fits
in with that definition and with other established major life activities.252
After it is shown that interacting with others is a major life activity, the
second step is to determine what constitutes a substantial limitation on
this major life activity. The Supreme Court has provided guidance on
what is meant by “substantial” and the three circuit courts that have
addressed whether interacting with others is a major life activity have
used three separate tests to determine what constitutes a substantial
limitation.253 Although it seems clear that interacting with others is a
major life activity, it is a closer question to determine what constitutes a
substantial limitation on that activity.
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Id. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
Jacques, 386 F.3d at 203.
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Id. at 204.
See supra Part III.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
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A. Interacting with Others as a Major Life Activity
1. It Falls Within the Definition of “Major”
Whether one uses the majority’s definition of “major” in
Bragdon,254 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s definition in his separate opinion
in Bragdon,255 or the majority’s definition in Toyota,256 interacting with
others falls within the definition of “major.”257 Interacting with others is
both an “important” and a “significant” activity.258 Human beings are
social creatures by nature and it is important for every individual to be
able to interact and communicate with others, not only for basic survival
needs, but also for entertainment, work, and family purposes. The fact
that all individuals must interact and communicate with others at some
point, and those that cannot are considered handicapped (such as the
mentally retarded), shows the significance of this activity.
Because of the importance and significance of interacting with
others, it is necessarily an activity that is of “central importance to daily
life” and one that occurs often.259 There are very few people that do not
interact with others on a daily basis, even if only on a minimal level.
Therefore interacting with others would also satisfy Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s definition of “greater in quantity, number, or extent.”260
In light of the foregoing, it is difficult to argue that interacting with
others is not “major” within the meaning of “major life activity.” The
fact that it is a major life activity is emphasized even more when it is
compared to established major life activities, as will be discussed in the
next section.
2. Similarity to Other Major Life Activities
Not only does interacting with others fit into the definition of
major, but it is also similar to many activities that are considered to be
major life activities. Like walking, breathing, and speaking, it is an
“essential [and] regular function . . . .”261 “Interacting with others” can
254

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998); see supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
255
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
256
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002); see supra
notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
257
See Hensel, supra note 3, at 1189-90.
258
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
259
See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
260
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
261
See McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999).

166

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:139

also be defined as “communicating with others.” “Communicating with
others” can in turn be defined in its simplest forms as “speaking” and
“hearing,” which are certainly major life activities.262 Some courts have
found that communication is a major life activity.263 In Soileau, the First
Circuit also indicated that communication could be considered a major
life activity, but did not definitively state that it is.264 It is difficult to see
how communication is not a major life activity if speaking and hearing
are. In this same vein, it is difficult to see how interacting with others is
not a major life activity if communication is.
Though interacting with others has been criticized as being too
vague,265 it is “no more vague than ‘caring for oneself,’”266 which is
recognized as a major life activity.267 Like caring for oneself, interacting
with others encompasses many activities.268 Interacting with others
includes everything from speaking and listening to expressing emotion
and managing conflicts. Of course the fact that other major life activities
fall within “interacting with others” is not determinative on the issue of
whether it is a major life activity, but it tends to show that it is.
The Second Circuit in Jacques characterized “interacting with
others” as an “essentially mechanical” function.269 What the court was
inferring is that, to interact with others, one does not have to be good at
it.270 It does not matter if the person has a bad personality or is not liked
by anyone; one only has to participate in the interaction to be “interacting
with others.”271 This objectivity shows that “interacting with others” is
similar to other major life activities, such as speaking or working, which
tend to look at ability to participate in the activity not how well one
participates. Of course for certain activities, such as seeing, how well one
sees goes directly to one’s ability to take part in the activity of seeing.

262

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2005).
See Purcell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. CIV.A.95-6720, 1998 WL 10236, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 9, 1998); see also Pritchard v. S. Co. Serv., No. CV-94-N-0475-5, 1995 WL
338662, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 1995). But see Hoeller v. Eaton Corp., 149 F.3d 621,
625 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming a lower court rejection of “communication skills and
interpersonal relationships” as major life activities).
264
Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997).
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See id.
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McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235.
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See, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638-39; Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research
Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1998).
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See Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (defining
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This, however, is not the case with regard to interacting with others, as
explained above.
Additionally, though courts have dismissed it as only persuasive
authority,272 the EEOC Compliance Manual lists “interacting with
others” as a major life activity.273 The Compliance Manual notes that the
list of major life activities is not limited to physical activities, rather
mental and emotional processes can be major life activities as well.274
3. Why the First, Ninth, and Second Circuits All Have the Right
Idea
Even though there is a split between the three circuits that have
decided the issue of whether interacting with others is a major life
activity, there is language from all three opinions that can be used to
support the finding of a major life activity. Despite finding that
interacting with others is not a major life activity, the First Circuit in
Soileau did state that a “narrowly defined concept going to essential
attributes of human communication could . . . be understood to be a
major life activity.”275 This directly supports the argument in the
previous section, that interacting with others is analogous to
communicating with others, and is thus a major life activity.
The First Circuit also focused on the language “ability to get along
with others” instead of “interacting with others.”276 The First Circuit was
correct in rejecting “ability to get along with others” as a major life
activity. The Second Circuit in Jacques “agree[d] with the First Circuit’s
observation that ‘getting along with others’ is an unworkably subjective
definition of a ‘major life activity’ under the ADA – in much the same
way that ‘perceiving’ (as distinct from merely ‘seeing’ or ‘hearing’)
would be an unworkably subjective ‘major life activity.’”277 The Second
Circuit then noted that “‘interacting with others’ . . . more objectively
describes a life activity than does ‘getting along with others,’ which
connotes proficiency or success and worsens the problem of subjectivity

272
See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997); see also
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (questioning the EEOC’s authority to
issue regulations implementing the ADA). But see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 513-15 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the EEOC has authority to issue regulations implementing the
ADA).
273
See EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 173, § 902.3(b).
274
Id.
275
Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15.
276
Id.
277
Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Soileau, 105
F.3d at 15).
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. . . .”278 There is a distinct difference between simply interacting with
others, whether one is good or bad at it (an “essentially mechanical”
function),279 and getting along with others, which implies that one is
liked by all and never has a conflict with anyone (an “evaluative
concept”).280 It is clear that such an activity cannot be considered a major
life activity. Therefore, both the First and Second Circuits are correct in
rejecting “ability to get along with others” as a major life activity.
It is possible that, if the issue is brought before the First Circuit in a
more direct fashion, namely specifically claiming the major life activity
of “interacting with others,” it would find that this is a major life activity.
This can be surmised from the First Circuit’s statement that
communication could be a major life activity, and the fact that the
Second Circuit, which found interacting with others as a major life
activity, agreed with the First Circuit’s rejection of the ability to get
along with others as a major life activity.
The main point on which the Second and Ninth Circuits agree is
that interacting with others is a major life activity.281 The disagreement
between these two circuits is over what constitutes a substantial
limitation on this major life activity, which will be discussed in the next
section.282
All three circuits are on the right track. First, the First and Second
Circuits rejected the “ability to get along with others” as a major life
activity,283 which is the correct approach. Second, the Second and Ninth
Circuits held that “interacting with others” is a major life activity,284
which is also the correct approach. Lastly, the First Circuit recognized
that communication could be a major life activity,285 which leaves the
door open for recognizing interacting with others as a major life activity.
B. The Correct Test for Substantial Limitation
Now that it has been shown that interacting with others is a major
life activity, the next essential step is to determine what constitutes a
substantial limitation on that major life activity. Three different tests
have been used by the three circuits – the First, Ninth, and Second – that
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have addressed whether interacting with others is a major life activity.286
The Second Circuit’s test is the most workable and better test of the
three. This is because it addresses the core aspect of interacting with
others – one’s ability to communicate with others.287
1. Possibilities
There are two possible models for the test to determine when the
major life activity of interacting with others is substantially limited.
These two possibilities are the two tests that have actually been applied
to the recognized major life activity of interacting with others.288 Other
circuit courts have addressed the issue of what will be considered a
substantial limitation on the major life activity of interacting with others
by assuming, without deciding, that it is one. However, these other courts
have merely cited the test set out by the Ninth Circuit in McAlindin,289
except for the First Circuit, which used its own approach in deciding
Soileau prior to McAlindin.290
a. The First Circuit’s Test: Soileau
In determining whether the plaintiff was substantially limited in the
major life activity of interacting with others, the First Circuit used the
EEOC definition of “substantial limitation,” which is essentially whether
the average person in the general population would be significantly
limited in performing the task.291 The First Circuit also considered the
286

See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
288
Because the Ninth and Second Circuits are the only two circuits to have recognized
the major life activity of “interacting with others,” they are the only two courts that have
genuinely addressed the issue of substantial limitation, as opposed to concluding that
“even if” interacting with others were a major life activity the requirement of substantial
limitation is not met. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
289
See Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
the plaintiff could not show that his “relations with others were characterized on a regular
basis by severe problems, for example, consistently high levels of hostility, social
withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir.
1999)); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
plaintiff could not show that her impairment “caused her to experience ‘high levels of
hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary’”) (citing
McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235); Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 276
(4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that plaintiff “fail[ed] to demonstrate that her problems with
social interaction over the course of her employment were ‘sufficiently severe’ to
establish a substantial limitation”) (referring to McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235).
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Compare Soileau, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997), with McAlindin, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th
Cir. 1999). See infra Part IV.B.1.a.
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Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2005)); see supra note
108 and accompanying text.
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factors suggested by the EEOC regulations,292 which include “the nature
and severity” of the impairment,293 the “duration” of the impairment,294
and the “long-term impact” of the impairment.295
b. The Ninth Circuit’s Test: McAlindin
The Ninth Circuit also used EEOC guidance as the basis for its
approach for determining whether the major life activity of interacting
with others is substantially limited. The court first noted that
“[r]ecognizing interacting with others as a major life activity of course
does not mean that any cantankerous person will be deemed substantially
limited in a major life activity.”296 The court then provided that “[m]ere
trouble getting along with coworkers is not sufficient to show a
substantial limitation.”297 Using the EEOC regulations, the court
recognized that “the limitation must be severe,” meaning that it must be
substantial when “compared to the ability of ‘the average person in the
general population.’”298 The court also used EEOC guidance in stating its
holding: “We hold that a plaintiff must show that his ‘relations with
others were characterized on a regular basis by severe problems, for
example, consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or
failure to communicate when necessary.’”299
c. The Second Circuit’s Test: Jacques
The Second Circuit spent much of its analysis of the substantial
limitation issue explaining why the Ninth Circuit’s approach in
McAlindin was incorrect.300 The court then stated its holding: “We hold
that a plaintiff is ‘substantially limited’ in ‘interacting with others’ when
the mental or physical impairment severely limits the fundamental ability
to communicate with others.”301 The court elaborated by stating when the
test is satisfied and when it is not.302 There is a substantial limitation
“when the impairment severely limits the plaintiff’s ability to connect
with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people and respond to
them, or to go among other people – at the most basic level of these
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15-16.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i) (2005).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) and (j)(2)(i)).
Id. (quoting EEOC on Psychiatric Disabilities at 5).
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activities.”303 There is not a substantial limitation when “a plaintiff
whose basic ability to communicate with others is not substantially
limited but whose communication is inappropriate, ineffective, or
unsuccessful.”304
2. Why the Second Circuit Is Correct
The First Circuit’s approach is too generalized. The test is not
specific and, like the EEOC regulations from which it is derived, can be
interpreted broadly. Some commentators criticized this approach by
saying that, even if interacting with others is recognized as a major life
activity, satisfying the standard for a substantial limitation is so difficult
that it is almost insurmountable.305
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is “unworkable, unbounded, and
useless as guidance” for making the determination of whether the major
life activity of interacting with others is substantially limited.306
Requiring a showing of “severe problems”307 and “consistently high
levels of hostility”308 misplaces the inquiry.309 Such requirements seem
akin to determining whether an individual gets along with others instead
of whether they can interact with others, as discussed above.
Argumentativeness and hostility are desirable characteristics in many
employment contexts,310 the practice of law being one of them.
Furthermore, requiring consistently high levels of hostility encourages a
“cantankerous” person to become even more difficult and bad
tempered.311 An employer that has an employee who is extremely crass
and harasses other employees would have to decide to either risk being
sued by the employee for being fired or risk being sued by others who
experience the hostile work environment that the employee’s behavior
creates.312 “Social withdrawal”313 and “failure to communicate when
necessary”314 seem to be more appropriate showings to require.
However, “social withdrawal” has many different meanings, and not all
of these meanings would be a substantial limitation on the ability to
303
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interact with others.315 Some individuals prefer solitude and choose to
spend time alone, but this does not make them substantially limited in
interacting with others.316 “Failure to communicate when necessary”
appears to be the only appropriate requirement of the Ninth Circuit’s test.
As with the Second Circuit’s test, this element goes to the core of
“interacting with others.”
The Second Circuit’s test is the best approach because, as
mentioned previously, it goes to the core of “interacting with others,”
which is the ability to communicate with others. The requirement of
showing a limitation on the “fundamental ability to communicate”317 gets
directly at the essence of interacting with others. The court’s elaboration
on what does and does not satisfy the standard performs two functions.
First, it makes the test even clearer and easier to apply by further
defining communication as the basic ability to “initiate contact with other
people and respond to them.”318 Second, it shows what is included in the
activity of interacting with others besides the core concept of
communication with others, i.e. the ability to “go among other
people.”319 This test also sets the clear standard that “inappropriate,
ineffective, or unsuccessful” communication is not enough to satisfy the
test for a substantial limitation.320 In sum, the Second Circuit test in
Jacques is the best approach to take because it identifies communication
as the core concept of interacting with others, but also recognizes that
interacting with others encompasses more than communication, such as
relating with and being among other people.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal circuit courts are divided over whether interacting with
others is a major life activity. Currently, one circuit, the First Circuit,
holds that it is not a major life activity, and two circuits, the Second and
Ninth Circuits, hold that it is a major life activity.321 This article argues
that the Ninth and Second Circuits are correct in finding that “interacting
with others” is a major life activity. Interacting with others falls within
the definition of “major,” as defined by the Supreme Court, because it is
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a significant activity that has “central importance in daily life.”322 It is
also similar to other major life activities.323
This article also argues that the correct test to determine when the
activity of interacting with others is substantially limited is when the
fundamental ability to communicate with others – initiating contact with
others, responding to them, and going among them – is severely
limited.324 This is the correct test because it recognizes the two central
aspects of interacting with others: communicating with people and being
among them.325
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